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Abstract 
We define and study a high-level language for describing actions, more expressive than the 
action language A introduced by Gelfond and Lifschitz. The new language, A’R, allows us to 
describe actions with indirect effects (ramifications), nondeterministic actions, and actions that 
may be impossible to execute. It has symbols for nonpropositional f uents and for the fluents 
that are exempt from the commonsense law of inertia. Temporal projection problems specified 
using the language JR can be represented as nested abnormality theories based on the situation 
calculus. @ 1997 Elsevier Science B.V. 
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Ramification problem 
1. Introduction 
Mary jumped into the lake, then got out of the water and put her hat on. 
Common sense allows us to answer some questions about the outcome of this series 
of events. 
l Is Mary in the lake? Of course not. She just got out of it. 
l Does she have the hut on? Of course she does. She just put it on. 
l Is she wet? Of course she is. She just got out of the lake. 
These are examples of reasoning about actions and their effects. Formalizing this 
form of commonsense reasoning has long been considered one of the central problems 
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of Artificial Intelligence. Existing approaches differ by their temporal ontologies (linear 
or branching time, time points or intervals, situations, events or histories), by the logic 
used (classical logic, its nonmonotonic extensions, logic programming), and by other 
details of the formalization (which objects are reified, how circumscription is applied, 
etc.). 
Properties of actions can be conveniently described in specialized “action languages”, 
such as the language A from [7]. Consider, for instance, the background knowledge 
about the effects of actions that is involved in the examples of commonsense reasoning 
above. Mary has performed three actions: jumping into the lake (J), getting out of the 
lake (G) and putting her hat on (P). We are interested in the effect of each of these 
actions on whether or not Mary is in the lake (L). In the language A, the effects of the 
actions J and G on L can be described by the propositions 
J causes L, 
G causes TL. 
There is no need to specify that P has no effect on L, because the semantics of A 
incorporates the “commonsense law of inertia”: when an action is performed, things are 
assumed by default to remain the same. 
The language d has been used as a tool for investigating the relationship between 
several other techniques for describing actions. For instance, in [ 111, the methods for 
formalizing actions in classical logic developed in [ 251 and [ 26 J , as well as the use of 
circumscription in [ I], are described as translations from d, and each of the translations 
is found to be sound and complete relative to the semantics of A. These theorems show 
that, for the action domains that can be represented in A, the three formalization methods 
produce equivalent results. 
In this paper, we introduce a new action language, AR, which is in several ways 
more expressive than A. 
( 1) In AR, actions may have indirect effects, or rumijications. Consider, for instance, 
the effect that jumping into the lake has on Mary being wet ( W). In d, it can 
be described by the proposition 
J causes W 
We would prefer, however, to treat the effect of J on W as a ramification of its 
effect on L. Any action that causes L to become true will make W true also: if 
Mary walks into the lake, or crawls into the lake, or is thrown into the lake by 
her boyfriend, she will get wet all the same. This relationship between L and W 
can be described in the new action language by writing 
always L 3 W 
(2) Actions described in AR can be nondeterministic. If Mary jumps into the lake 
while having her hat on (H) then maybe she will lose her hat, or maybe not. In 
AR, this indeterminacy can be described by the proposition 
J possibly changes H if H. 
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(3) In AR, an action can be impossible to execute in some states. For instance, Mary 
cannot get out of the lake if she is already on the shore. We will write this as 
impossible G if 4 
In fact, this will be treated as an abbreviation for the proposition 
G causes False if ?L. 
(4) The language AR has symbols for nonpropositionalj7uents. Generally, a “fluent” 
[ 241 is something that depends on the state of the world. For instance, L (being 
in the lake), W (being wet) and H (having the hat on) are fluents, because each 
can be false or true depending on the particular situation. The possible values 
of these fluents are the truth values of propositional logic, F and T. In a more 
elaborate formalization, we might wish to introduce the nonpropositional fluent 
symbol Location, representing Mary’s current location. AR allows us to write 
Location is Luke 
instead of L, and to use other location symbols, such as Shore, Home or Library, 
in place of Lake. 
(5) In AR, a fluent can be classified as noninertial, which makes it exempt from 
the commonsense law of inertia. For instance, the sun may be now behind the 
clouds (C), but there is no guarantee that this will be still the case a minute 
later, no matter what Mary will be doing during this time. The fluent C is 
noninertial. Noninertial fluents are needed also for expressing explicit definitions 
(Section 4.3). 
The next two sections of the paper describe the syntax and semantics of AR and relate 
this language to the action language A from [ 71. Our work on the “debugging” of the 
semantics of AR has involved the verification of several properties of the language that 
can be naturally expected to hold for action languages; these properties are discussed in 
Section 4. In Section 5, we define the syntax and semantics of “initial conditions” and of 
“value propositions”. This allows us to express formally temporal projection problems 
involving actions described in AR. In Section 6 we show how temporal projection 
problems of this kind can be expressed in terms of the version of circumscription [22] 
called nested abnormality theories [ 181. Reductions of this kind are of special interest in 
connection with recent advances in the automation of circumscriptive reasoning [ 3,6]. 
The relation of this paper to earlier work on action is discussed in Section 7. Proofs are 
relegated to the appendix. 
Preliminary reports on this work are published as [ 141 and [ 81. d72 differs from 
the language AR0 described in the first of these papers in two ways. First, AT& did 
not include symbols for nonpropositional fluents (see the end of Section 4.4). Second, 
instead of possibly changes, it used the construct releases, whose semantics turned 
out to be less satisfactory (see Section 4.1) . Furthermore, this paper differs from both 
preliminary publications in that “value propositions” are not treated here as part of 
AR, and their use is restricted to the conceptually simpler case of temporal projection 
problems. 
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2. Syntax 
To be precise, AR is not a single language, but rather a family of languages. A 
particular language in this group is characterized by 
l a nonempty set of symbols that are called Jluent names, 
l a function, associating with every fluent name F a nonempty set RngF of symbols 
that is called the range of F, 
l a subset of fluent names that are called inertial, 
l a nonempty set of symbols that are called action names. 
2.1. Formulas, propositions and action descriptions 
An atomic formula is an expression of the form 
(F is V) 
where F is a fluent name, and V E RngF. A formula is a propositional combination of 
atomic formulas. 
There are three types of propositions in AR-constraints, determinate effect propo- 
sitions, and indeterminate effect propositions. A constraint is an expression of the form 
always C (1) 
where C is a formula. A determinate effect proposition is an expression of the form 
A causes C if P (2) 
where A is an action name, and C, P are formulas. An indeterminate effect proposition 
is an expression of the form 
A possibly changes F if P (3) 
where A is an action name, F an inertial fluent name, and P a formula (“precondition”). 
An action description is a set of propositions. 
2.2. Notational conventions 
In formulas, we will omit some parentheses, as customary in classical logic. We will 
denote some fixed tautological formula by True, and TTrue by False. A determinate 
effect proposition (2) will be written as 
A causes C 
if P is True, and as 
impossible A if P 
if C is False. An indeterminate effect proposition (3) will be written as 
A possibly changes F 
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if its precondition P is True. For any action name A and formula C, 
A initiates C 
stands for the pair of propositions 
A causes C, 
impossible A if C. 
A fluent name F is propositional if 
RngF = {F,T}. 
If F is a propositional fluent name, we will abbreviate the atomic formula 
F is T 
by F, and the atomic formula 
F is F 
by 7. 
Using these notational conventions, we can formalize the example from the Introduc- 
tion as follows: 
always L 3 W; 
J initiates L, 
J possibly changes H if H, 
G initiates -L, 
P initiates H. 
(4) 
Here L, W, H are inertial propositional lhtent names, and J, G, P are action names. 
3. Semantics 
The meaning of an action description D is represented by the corresponding transition 
function, ResD. This function maps an action name and a state (defined below) to a set 
of states. Intuitively, ResD (A, a) is the set of outcomes that may result from executing 
A in state (T. 
3.1. States 
A valuation is a function that is defined on the set of fluent names and maps each 
fluent name F to an element of its range. A valuation (+ can be extended to atomic 
formulas in a standard way: 
T 
c(F is V) = 
if c(F) = V, 
F otherwise. 
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It can be further extended to arbitrary formulas according to the truth tables of propo- 
sitional logic. A valuation u satisjes a formula C, or a constraint ( 1) , if U(C) = T. 
A state for an action description D is a valuation that satisfies all constraints in D. 
For instance, the states for description (4) are the truth-valued functions on {L, w H} 
that satisfy L > W. There are 6 such functions: 
-- 
LWH, EWH, L WH, LWi?, EW H, L W H. 
(We represent each state by the set of atomic formulas that are satisfied in that state.) 
3.2. The transition function 
For any action name A and state (T, let Resi( A, v) stand for the set of states cr’ 
such that, for each determinate effect proposition (2) in D, d satisfies C whenever 
v satisfies P. The set ResD (A, a) will be defined as the subset of Resi (A, a) whose 
elements are “close” to (+. 
In order to make this precise, the following notation is needed. For any action name 
A and any states U, u’, by New; ( U, cl) we denote the set of formulas 
F is d(F) 
such that 
l F is inertial and d(F) # (T(F), or 
(5) 
l for some indeterminate effect proposition (3) in D, c satisfies P. 
The condition a’(F) f a(F) in the definition of this function expresses that (5) is a 
“new fact” that becomes true if the execution of A in state (T results in state u’. The 
set New$( g, cr’) includes such “new facts” for all inertial fluent names F. (If F is 
noninertial then it is not expected to keep its old value after performing an action, so 
that the change in its value is disregarded.) On the other hand, if some indeterminate 
effect proposition allows F to change, we treat its value in state u’ as “new” even if it 
happens to coincide with the value of F in state g. 
Now the transition function ResD is defined as follows: Reso( A, v) is the set of 
states U’ E Res$ (A, UT) for which New; (c, (T’) is minimal relative to set inclusion-in 
other words, for which there is no cr” E Rest (A, a) such that Newt (u, (T”) is a proper 
subset of Newi ((+, a’). This minimality condition is the feature of the semantics of AR 
that represents the commonsense law of inertia. 
We will sometimes drop the subscript D in the symbols New$, Rest and ResD, when 
the action description D is understood from the context. 
3.3. Example 
As an illustration, consider the transition function for example (4). The action name 
J is described by the propositions 
J causes L, 
J causes False if L, 
J possibly changes H if H. 
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EWWH J - LWH< J 
-- 
LWH 
P 
--- 
LWH 
Fig. I. Transition diagram for the lake example. 
For any states v and u’, (T’ E Res’(J, (T) iff cr’( L) = T and a(L) = F. Consequently, 
ResO( J, a) = 
{ LWH, LW??} if a(L) = F, 
0 otherwise. 
Furthermore, 
{LWR} if c(L) = (T(H) = F, 
Res( J, g) = {LWH, LWB} if cr( L) = F and a(H) = T, 
0 otherwise. 
--- -- 
As an example, let us verify these assertions for (T equal to L W H and to L WH. In the 
first case, note that 
NewA(~~~, LWE) = {L is T, W is T}, 
iVewA(Epi7H, LWH) = {L is T, W is T, H is T}. 
--- 
Consequently, the element LWH of Res’( J, L W H) does not satisfy the minimality --- 
condition and is not included in Res( J, L W H). In the second case, 
NewA(EwH, LWH) = {L is T, W is T, H is T}, 
NewA(zwH, LW??) = {L is T, W is T, H is F}, 
and the minimality condition does not require removing any of the elements of -- 
Res”( J, L WH) . 
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The values of Res for the other two action names can be computed in a similar 
way. The following notation helps express the results of computation concisely. For any 
valuation U, any fluent name F and any V in the range of F, the expression u[F/V] 
stands for the valuation that takes the value V on F and otherwise agrees with (T: 
u[F/V](F’) = 
V if F’ = F, 
a( F’) otherwise. 
For instance, 
(LWH)[L/F] = (LWH). 
In this notation, 
Resf G, CT) = 
{(T[L/F]} if (T(L) = T, 
0 otherwise, 
Res(P, v) = 
{a[H/T]} if (T(H) = F, 
0 otherwise. 
The transition function Res is graphically represented by Fig. 1. 
Let us go back now to the scenario described in the Introduction: Mary jumped into 
the lake (J), then got out of the water (G) and put her hat on (P). The examples of 
commonsense conclusions given there can be interpreted as assertions about paths in the 
transition diagram. Consider any path of length 3 whose arcs are labeled J, G, P, and 
let (T be the end node of this path. Mary is not in the lake: a(L) = F. Mary has her hat 
on: a(H) = T. Mary is wet: a(W) = T. 
3.4. Simple descriptions 
There is a special case when the definition of the transition function can be simplified. 
A formula is simple if it is a conjunction of atomic formulas. Note that the empty 
conjunction True is included in simple formuias. A simple formula is contradictory 
if it includes a pair of atomic parts F is VI, F is Vz with VI # V2; otherwise, it is 
noncontradictory. A determinate effect proposition (2) is simple if both C and P are 
noncontradictory simple formulas. 
An action description D is simple if 
a each fluent name of D is inertial, 
l each proposition in D is a simple determinate effect proposition, 
l for any propositions 
A ca&es Cl if PI, 
A causes CZ if PI 
in D such that Pi A P2 is noncontradictory, Ci A CT is noncontradictory also. 
Here is an example. Each of m blocks BI, . . . , I?,,, can be located on any of n tables 
T, , . . . , z,. The fluent names are Location ( I < i < m); all of them are inertial 
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and have the range consisting of the symbols Tk ( 1 < k 6 n). The action names are 
MoveOnto( B;, Tk) (move block Bi onto table Tk) and MoveNextTo( Bi, Bj) (move block 
Bj onto the table that has B,i on it). The action description consists of the propositions 
MoveOnto( 6, t) causes (Location(b) is t) , 
MoveNextTo( b, b’) causes (Locution(b) is t) if (Lucation(b’) is t) 
for all b,b’ E {Bl,..., B,,,} and t E {TI, . . . , T,}. This description is simple. 
The following theorem shows that, for a simple action description D, every value 
of ResD is a singleton-there is exactly one way to execute any action in any state. 
Moreover, the only element of Reso (A, CT) can be described without an explicit reference 
to the minimality condition. 
Let D be a simple action description, A an action name, and (T a state. By ResZ, (A, u) 
we denote the state (r’ defined as follows: For any fluent name F, if D includes a 
determinate effect proposition (2) such that 
(i) o satisfies P, and 
(ii) C has a conjunctive term of the form F is V 
then a’(F) = V; if not then (T’(F) = (T(F). It is clear that this definition characterizes 
the state (+’ uniquely. In the state ResT, (A, a), fluents have the same values as in g 
except when a different value is “required” by a proposition in D. 
Theorem 1. Let D be a simple action description. For any action name A and any 
state (+, 
Reso(A.a) = {Res*,(A,v)}. 
An “effect proposition” of the action language d [7] is essentially a simple propo- 
sition (2) which does not include nonpropositional fluent names and in which C is 
atomic. The description of the semantics of such propositions in A is similar to the 
definition of Res;j( A, a) given above. In this sense, Theorem 1 shows that A is a 
“sublanguage” of AR. 
4. The mathematics of action descriptions 
The mathematical properties of AR established in this section are not surprising- 
one would expect them to hold for any action language of this kind. The verification 
of these properties was, however, an important element of our work on the design of 
the language, because it has allowed us to catch a few nontrivial oversights in earlier 
versions. 
4.1. Replucement 
Mary has a little lamb, and the lamb always follows Mary wherever she goes. In AR, 
this can be expressed by the constraints 
always Location(Mury) is X > Location(Lamb) is X 
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for all symbols X in the range (assumed to be common) of the fluent names 
Locution ( Mary) and Location ( Lamb). 
In an action description that includes these constraints, the two fluent names are inter- 
changeable: replacing Location(Mury), in one or many occurrences, by Location(Lumb) 
would not affect the meaning of the description. 
To state this replacement principle in a general form, we need the following definition. 
Fluent names F, F’ are equivalent with respect to a set S of constraints if 
l they are either both inertial or both noninertial, 
l they have a common range, 
l for every valuation (T that satisfies all constraints in S, a(F) = a( F’). 
Theorem 2. Let S be a set of constraints, D an action description, and F: F’ fluent 
names equivalent with respect to S. If an action description D’ is obtained from D by 
replacing some occurrences of F with F’ then 
Ressun = Ressuol 
As mentioned in the Introduction, the earlier version of AR described in [ 141 treats 
indeterminate effect propositions differently, in a less satisfactory way. A problem with 
that version was that the assertion of Theorem 2 does not hold for it. An example 
communicated to us by Fangzhen Lin (October 26, 1993) demonstrated the importance 
of verifying this replacement property. 
Besides the replacement of a fluent name, we can consider the replacement of a 
formula. We say that formulas B and B’ are equivalent with respect to a set S of 
constraints if every valuation satisfying all constraints in S satisfies B E B’. 
Theorem 3. Let S be a set of constraints, D an action description, and B ,B' formulas 
equivalent with respect to S. If an action description D’ is obtained from D by replacing 
some occurrences of B with B’ then 
i?eSSuD = ReSSuDl. 
Consider, for instance, the expression -L in (4), which stands for the formula 
-(L is T). Theorem 3, with S = 0, shows that the meaning of (4) will not change if 
we replace this formula by z, which stands for (L is F). 
4.2. Constraints 
Constraints play a double role in the semantics of AR. First, they tell us which 
valuations are counted as states. Second, they are taken into account in calculating the 
indirect effects of actions. In this second function, a constraint can be replaced by a set 
of determinate effect propositions: 
Theorem 4. Let S be a set of constraints, and let S’ be the set of determinate effect 
propositions A causes C for all constraints always C in S and all action names A. For 
any action description D, any action name A and any state cr of S U D, 
Ressub (A, a) = Ressjuo (A, (T) . 
E. Giunchiglia et al. /Artificial Intelligence 95 (1997) 409-438 419 
For instance, the constraint 
always L 3 W 
in (4) can be replaced by the effect propositions 
J causes L > W, 
G causes L > W, 
P causes L 3 W 
The transition diagram for the description S U D is a part of the transition diagram for 
the new description S’ U D: the former can be obtained from the latter by removing the 
nodes that violate the constraints in S and the arcs that begin in these nodes. 
4.3. Explicit dejinitions 
Mary is ready to go back home when she is not wet and has her hat on. We would 
like to introduce an abbreviation for this propositional combination of fluents, TWA H. 
To this end, extend description (4) by adding the propositional noninertial fluent name 
R to its language and by including in it the “explicit definition” of R: 
always R E (7W A H). 
We chose to declare the new name R noninertial because we expect the effect of any 
action on R to be determined by its effects on W and H and by the definition of R, not 
by inertia. 
The theorem stated below shows that adding an explicit definition to an action de- 
scription leaves its semantics essentially unchanged. 
A constraint in an action description D is an explicit dejinition of a propositional 
fluent name F if it has the form 
always F = C (6) 
and F 
0 is noninertial, 
l does not occur in C, 
l does not occur in any other proposition in D. 
An action description D that includes an explicit definition of a propositional fluent 
name F is “equivalent” to the action description D’ obtained from D by deleting this 
definition and deleting F from the set of fluent names, but not in the strong sense that 
they define the same transition function, as in Theorem 2. Indeed, the fluent names 
and the states of D’ are not the same as the fluent names and the states of D. We 
can only claim that there exists an isomorphism between D and D’, in the following 
sense. 
Let D and D’ be action descriptions with the same action names. An isomorphism 
between D and D’ is a one-to-one function f from the set of states of D onto the set 
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of states of D’ such that, for every action name A and every state u of D, f maps 
Reso(A,~) onto Reso!(A,f(vT)). 
Theorem 5. Let D be an action description containing an explicit definition of a 
propositional Jluent name F, and let D’ be obtained from D by deleting this definition 
and by deleting F from the set of J-Gent names. For any state IT of D, let (T,V be the 
restriction of CT to the set offuent names that are different from F. The function CT H flF 
is an isomorphism between D and D’. 
It is essential for the validity of this theorem that F is required to be noninertial. 
Without noninertial fluent names, we would not be able to express explicit definitions 
in the language. 
4.4. Nonpropositionaljluents 
The next result shows that a nonpropositional fluent name with a finite range can be 
eliminated in favor of propositional fluent names. A fluent with n possible values can 
be replaced by IZ propositional fluents; constraints included in the new description will 
require that exactly one of these fluents be true in any state. 
Let D be an action description, and let F be a set of fluent names in the language 
of D such that every fluent name in F has a finite range. The action description DF is 
defined as follows. 
The language of DF is obtained from the language of D by replacing every F in 
F by new propositional fluent names F” for all V E Rng,r. The name F” is declared 
inertial if F is inertial in the language of D. For any formula C in the language of D, 
CF stands for the result of replacing all its atomic parts 
F is V 
such that F E F by 
F” is T. 
The propositions of DF are 
l the constraints 
for all constraints (1) in D, 
l the determinate effect propositions 
A causes CF if PF 
for all determinate effect propositions (2) in D, 
l the indeterminate effect propositions 
A possibly changes F if P,G 
for all indeterminate effect propositions (3) in D with F $! F, 
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l the indeterminate effect propositions 
A possibly changes FV if PF 
for all indeterminate effect propositions (3) in D with F E F and all V in the 
range of F. 
l the constraints 
always 7 ( F’/’ A FV? ) 
and 
always V F” 
“~Rnw 
for all fluent names F E F and all pairs of distinct values VI, V2 in the range of F. 
The theorem below shows that DF is isomorphic to D. For every state u of D, define 
the state (TF of DF as follows: for any F E F and any V E RngF, 
CF( Fv) = 
T if g(F) = V, 
F otherwise; 
for any F $ F, 
vF(F) =a(F). 
Theorem 6. Let D be an action description, and let F be a set of fluent names in 
the language of D such that every fluent name in F has a jinite range. The function 
u I+ CF is an isomorphism between D and DF. 
In this sense, nonpropositional fluents with finite ranges are redundant. Any action 
description that involves only fluents with finite ranges can be effectively reduced to a 
description that involves propositional fluents only. 
As an example, consider a disk divided into n sectors (n > 1) and an action which 
rotates the disk by l/n of a full turn. One way to describe the system is to use the 
fluent name Orientation whose range consists of n symbols 0, . , n - 1. The effect of 
the action Turn can be described by the proposition 
Turn causes (Orientation is (i + 1) mod n ) if (Orientation is t ) 
for i = I,..., n - I. Alternatively, we can introduce n propositional fluent names 
Orientationi (0 6 i < n) and the propositions 
Turn causes Orientation(‘+‘) mod n if Orientation’, 
always -(Orientation’ A Orientationi), 
always Orientation’ V . . V Orientatiod- 
(O<i<j<n) 
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4.5. Indeterminate effect propositions 
If an indeterminate effect proposition 
A possibly changes F if P 
in an action description is replaced by a determinate effect proposition of the form 
A causes (F is V) if P 
then the sets Res(A, a) will typically become smaller. Consider, for instance, the propo- 
sition 
J possibly changes H if H (7) 
from the lake example. In Section 3.3 we saw that, for every state cr with a(H) = T, 
Res(J, a) = {LWH, LWfj}. 
If we replace (7) by 
J causes (H is F) if H 
then the lake example will become “more determinate”: the set Res(J, C) of the possible 
outcomes of the action J will lose the first of its two elements. 
The theorem below shows that a state is a possible outcome of an action A in the 
original description if and only if it is a possible outcome of A in at least one of the 
“more determinate” descriptions corresponding to different choices of V in the range of 
F. Moreover, this process can be applied to many indeterminate effect propositions at 
once-for instance, to all indeterminate effect propositions in the given description. 
Let S be a set of indeterminate effect propositions. A choice function for S is a 
function c such that 
l the domain of c is the set of the fluent names F in all propositions (3) in S, 
l for every F in the domain of c, c(F) E RngF. 
For any choice function c, SC stands for the set of the determinate effect propositions 
A causes (F is c(F)) if P 
for all propositions (3) in S. 
Theorem 7. For any action description D, any set S of indeterminate efict proposi- 
tions, any action name A and any state u of D, ReSDus(A, or> is the union of the sets 
ResDusC (A, CT) over ali choice functions c for s. 
5. Temporal projection 
As observed at the end of Section 3.3, some commonsense conclusions about the 
effects of actions described in AR can be viewed as assertions about paths in the 
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corresponding transition diagram. In this section we introduce a “query language” that 
can be used, in conjunction with AR, to describe properties of such paths. 
Let us go back to the lake example. Even if nothing is known about the current state 
of affairs, we can predict that, should Mary jump into the lake, get out of the water and 
then put her hat on, she will be not in the lake but still wet, and she will have her hat 
on. This is an example of “temporal projection”, that is, predicting the future on the 
basis of what is known about the effects of actions. Symbolically, this conclusion will 
be expressed in the query language defined below as follows: 
TL A W IY H after J; G; f! (8) 
A temporal projection problem may include, in addition to an action description, some 
assumptions about the initial state of the world. In the lake example, if we know that 
initially L /1 H 
-Mary is in the lake and has her hat on right now-then we can predict that, should 
she return to the shore, her hat will be still on her head: 
H after G. (9) 
As in Section 2, consider a set of fluent names with their ranges, some of them 
designated as inertial, and a set of action names. An initial condition is an expression 
of the form 
initially C (10) 
where C is a formula. A value proposition is an expression of the form 
C after Al ; . . . ; A,, (11) 
where C is a formula and Al, . . . , A, (n > 0) are action names. Value propositions are 
conditions on the values that fluents would have should a certain sequence of actions be 
executed. 
A domain description is the union of an action description and a set of initial condi- 
tions. We will define when a value proposition is a “consequence” of a given domain 
description. 
First, we need two auxiliary definitions. A histov for an action description D is a 
path in the corresponding transition diagram, that is, a finite sequence 
m~>A~,w,...,&,u,, (12) 
(n 3 0) such that ao, @I,. . , u,~ are states, AI,. . , A,, are action names, and 
(+, E ResD(Ai,ui_l) (1 < i < n). 
A history ( 12) satisjies an initial condition (10) if (70 satisfies C. 
Consider now an action description D, a set I of initial conditions, and a value 
proposition ( 11). We say that ( 11) is a consequence of the domain description D u I 
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if, for any history for D of the form co,Al, ~1,. . . , A,,cr,,, that satisfies all initial 
conditions in I, u,? satisfies C. 
For example, (8) is a consequence of action description (4), and (9) is a consequence 
of the domain description obtained from (4) by adding the initial condition 
initially L A H. (13) 
Note that by asserting that (11) is a consequence of a certain domain description we 
do not claim that the actions A,, . , . , A,, can be executed. On the contrary, in the case 
when this string of actions is not executable, the consequence relation trivially holds. 
For instance, if instead of (13) we add to (4) the initial condition 
initially H 
or even 
initially 1L A H, 
value proposition (9) will still be a consequence. 
The consequence relation defined above is nonmonotonic, because some consequences 
of D U I can be lost when a proposition is added to D. Adding an initial condition, how- 
ever, can only make the set of consequences bigger. This fact is a restricted monotonicity 
property in the sense of [ 161. 
6. Temporal projection problems as abnormality theories 
In this section, we assume that the underlying language has finitely many fluent 
names, each with a finite range, and finitely many action names. We restrict attention 
to finite action descriptions in this language. An arbitrary temporal projection problem 
associated with such a description is encoded here, in a simple and modular fashion, 
as a problem of reasoning in a nested abnormality theory [ 181 based on the situation 
calculus. 
The abnormality theory corresponding to a given finite action description D and a set 
I of initial conditions will be denoted by NAT( D, I). 
6.1. The language of NAT( D, I> 
The language of the theory is many-sorted, with the following sorts: 
( 1) Actions. The universe of actions will be in a one-to-one correspondence with the 
set of action names of D. 
(2) Values. The universe of values will be in a one-to-one correspondence with the 
union of the ranges of the fluent names of D. 
(3) Sifuations. Intuitively, a situation “is the complete state of the universe at an 
instant of time” [24]. The universe of situations will include also an auxiliary 
object which stands for “undefined”. It will help us represent actions that are not 
always executable. 
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(4) Aspects. As in [22], aspects will be used to distinguish between different kinds 
of abnormality. 
The variables of the first three sorts will be denoted by a, al ,a~, . ., L:, ~‘1, ~2,. . and 
s, S1, s2,. . . . 
The language includes the following object constants: 
l every action name of D is an action constant, 
l every element of the union of the ranges of the fluent names of D is a value 
constant, 
l So (for the initial situation) and I (“undefined”) are situation constants, 
l for every inertial fluent name F of D, F is an aspect constant. 
Finally, the language includes the following function and predicate constants: 
l Result represents a function that maps an action and a situation to a situation, 
l every fluent name F of D represents a function that maps a situation to a value, 
l for every fluent name F of D, FR represents the function that is explicitly defined 
by the formula 
FR(u,s) = F(Result(a,s)), (14) 
l Poss represents the predicate that is explicitly defined by the formula 
Pos.r(u, s) s Result(u, s) + 1. (15) 
Note that formulas in the sense of AR (Section 2.1) are not among the formulas 
of the first-order language with these nonlogical constants. To avoid confusion, we will 
refer here to the formulas in the sense of AR as “domain formulas”. For any domain 
formula C and any situation term t, by C(t) we denote the formula obtained from C 
as the result of replacing each atomic part F is V by F(r) = V. For instance, 
( -(Orientation is 2) ) (SO) 
stands for 
Orientution( SO) # 3. 
For any domain formula C, and action term tl and any situation term t2, by CR( tl, t2) 
we denote the formula obtained from C as the result of replacing each atomic part 
F is V by F’(tl,tz) = V. 
6.2. The axioms of NAT( D, I) 
The commonsense law of inertia will be expressed in NAT( D, Z) by the formulas 
Poss(u,s)Au=FR(u,s)A~Ab(&qz,s) >u=F(s) 
for all inertial fluent names F (“normally, if L’ is the value of F after executing an 
action then u equals the value that F had previously”). We will denote the list of these 
formulas by LZ. 
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The formulas expressing the effect propositions from D are defined as follows. If Q 
is a determinate effect proposition (2) then G is the formula 
P(s) APoss(A,s) > CR(A,s). 
For instance, the translation of 
Turn causes (Orientation is 6) if (Orientation is 3) 
is 
Orientation(s) = 5 A Poss( Turn, s) 1 OrientationR( Turn, s) = 6. 
If Q is an indeterminate effect proposition (3) then 6 is the formula 
P(S) >Ab@,FR(A,s),A,s) 
Let FI , . . , F[ be all fluent names in the language of D. In the following list of 
axioms of NAT( D, I), DA stands for the set of all determinate propositions in D, Di 
stands for the set of all indeterminate propositions in D, and D, stands for the set of 
domain formulas that includes 
l the formulas C for all constraints always C in D, and 
l the formulas 
v Fi is V 
V~Rngr, 
for all i (1 < i 6 I). 
Group I, Unique names axioms: cl # c2 for all pairs ~1, cl of distinct object constants 
of the same sort. In particular, this group includes the axiom SO f 1. 
Group 2. Domain closure axioms: 
a=Al V...Va=A,,,, 
L’ = v, v . . v u = v, , 
where Ai, _ _ . , A,,, are ali action constants, and Vi,. . . , v, are all value constants in the 
language. 
Group 3. Translations of the constraints: 
C(s) (C ED,). 
Group 4. Explicit definjtions: definitions (14) of FR for all fluent names F, and 
definition (15) of Pass. 
Group 5. Characterization of the effects of actions: 
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{F,R,...,F;: 
LI, 
6 (QED;), 
{Ff,...,F/?,maxPoss: 
TPOSS( a, I), 
e^ (QED~), 
CR(a,s) (c E DC) 
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(16) 
Group 6. Translations of the initial conditions: 
for every proposition initially C in 1. 
Group 5 is, of course, the main part of the theory. The inner block tells us that an 
action can be executed unless this is prohibited by the determinate effect propositions 
and constraints of D. The outer circumscription encodes the idea of inertia. The nesting 
of blocks reflects our intention to decide first which actions can be executed, and then 
what the effects of these actions are. 
6.3. The soundness and completeness theorem 
To express value propositions in the language of the situation calculus, we need the 
following notation: for any actions Al, . , A,,, 
stands for the term 
If Q is a value proposition (11) then Q stands for 
[AI,...,A,,I f 13 ct[A~>...,A,,l). 
The following theorem expresses the soundness and completeness of the translation 
described above. 
Theorem 8. For any $nite action description D, any set I of initial conditions and any 
value proposition Q, Q is a consequence of the nested abnormality theory NAT( D, Z) 
iff Q is a consequence of the domain description D II 1. 
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7. Related work 
Early attempts to describe properties of actions in classical logic have led to the 
discovery of the frame problem-the problem of specifying which facts do not change 
when an action is performed. The assumption that “if a person has a telephone, he still 
has it after looking up a number in the telephone book’ [24] is an example. Methods 
have been developed for expressing such “frame axioms ” in a systematic and compact 
way [5,26,29]. 
An alternative approach to the frame problem is to formalize, once and for all, the 
commonsense law of inertia, which, in combination with any set of domain-specific ef- 
fect axioms, would lead to exactly the same conclusions as the appropriate set of frame 
axioms. This idea was among the first examples of default reasoning that motivated 
the development of nonmonotonic logics, including circumscription, However, the first 
circumscriptive solution to the frame problem [ 221 turned out to be unsatisfactory [ IO]. 
Among the formalizations proposed in response to this criticism, [ 1 ] was particularly in- 
fluential, because it could handle actions with indirect effects; see [ 121 on its limitations. 
A survey of nonmonotonic solutions to the frame problem can be found in [ 281. It can 
be argued that the difference between the two kinds of theories of action-“classical” 
and “nonmonotonic’‘-is not as significant as commonly thought [ 18, Section 5.31. 
In research on action, it turned out to be difficult to discuss the possibilities and 
limitations of the available methods in a precise and general way. For a long time, the 
tradition was to explain every new approach with reference to a few standard examples, 
such as the blocks world or the shooting scenario from [lo]. Competing approaches 
used to be evaluated and compared mostly in terms of their ability to handle these 
examples and their enhancements. Such analysis does not say much about the range of 
applicability of each method. More recently, several researchers attempted to overcome 
this problem and to discuss representing action in a methodical and theoretically sound 
way. Three approaches to the systematic study of actions that are being pursued today 
most actively are associated with the ideas of a causal theory [ 201, of a dynamical 
system [ 271, and of an action language [ 7 I. 
Some extensions of the original action language d proposed in the literature include 
features that are not incorporated in the language AR studied in this paper: parame- 
ters 143, concurrency [ 21, dependent fluents [ 91 and static causal laws [ 19,2 1,301. 
Combining these proposals in one action language is a topic for future work. 
The circumscriptive approach to action presented in Section 6 uses nested abnormality 
theories to combine the “theory update” view of [ 311 with the syntax of the situation 
calculus. Some computational experiments based on a similar use of circumscription are 
described in [ 151. 
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Appendix A. Proofs 
A.1. Proof of Theorem I (Section 3.4) 
Theorem 1. Let D be a simple action description. For any action name A and any 
state c7. 
ResDtA,u) = {ResE(A,a)}. 
Consider an action name A and a state g. Recall that (T’ is defined as follows: For 
any Ruent name F, if D includes a determinate effect proposition (2) such that 
(i) u satisfies P, and 
(ii) C has a conjunctive term of the form F is V 
then (T’(F) = V; if not then V’(F) = a(F). 
It is clear that V’ E Res’( A, a). We will show that, for any valuation U” in Res’( A, u) 
that is different from (T’, NewA (v, g’) is a proper subset of New* (a, a”). 
Let A be the set of fluent names F such that D includes a determinate effect propo- 
sition (2) with properties (i) and (ii). Since u” E Res’( A, a), 
c’(F) = 
U”(F) if F E A, 
c(F) otherwise. 
Consequently, 
New”(cr.p’) = {F is (T’(F) 1 g’(F) Z (T(F)} 
= {F is u’(F) 1 F E A, c+‘(F) f a(F)} 
= {F is d’(F) 1 F E A, a”(F) #= a(F)} 
C_ New*(u,&‘). 
To see that the two sets cannot be equal, consider any fluent name F such that 
a’(F) f g”(F). For this F, u’(F) = g(F), because otherwise F is d(F) would 
be in NewA (g, a’) and hence in New* (g, g”), contrary to the choice of F. It fol- 
lows that g”(F) f v(F), so that F is d’(F) is in New*( c+, a”), but not in 
New*(a,cr’). 0 
A.2. Proof of Theorem 2 (Section 4. I) 
Theorem 2. Let S be a set of constraints, D an action description, and F; F’ fluent 
names equivalent with respect to S. If an action description D’ is obtained from D by 
replacing some occurrences of F with F’ then 
Ressuo = Ressuol. 
Consider two different fluent names F, F’ that are equivalent with respect to S. If 
C’ is obtained from a formula C by replacing some occurrences of F with F’ then, for 
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every valuation (T satisfying S, c+(C) = a(C’). It follows that S U D and S U D’ have 
the same states, and, furthermore, 
Red&, = Rest,,, , 
Take an action name A and states U, u’, u” of S U D. We need to verify that 
New&D (u, a’) 2 New&,, (u, a”) (A.1) 
iff 
New&, (u, u’) C New&,,, (u, u”). (-4.2) 
Let W he the set of the fluent names F’ such that D includes an indeterminate effect 
proposition 
A possibly changes F* if P (A.31 
for which fl satisfies P. For any state u*, New&(a, u*) can he characterized as the 
set of all atomic formulas F* is V such that 
(i) F’ is inertial and V = CT*(F*) f a(F*), or 
(ii) F’ E w and V = c*(F*). 
Similarly, let W’ he the set of the fluent names F* such that D’ includes a proposition 
(A.3) for which u satisfies P; then NewA sUD, (q, u*) is the set of all atomic formulas 
F* is V that satisfy (i) or 
(ii’) F’ E w’ and V = u*(F*). 
Assume (A.1 ) . To prove (A.2)) take any formula F’ is V in New&, ((T, u’). 
Case (i): F* is inertial and V = a’( F’) # u( F*). Then F* is V belongs to the left- 
hand side of (A. 1) , and consequently to the right-hand side also, so that V = u”( F* ) . 
It follows that F* is V belongs to New& (u, u”). 
Case (ii): F* E w’ and V = u’( F*). If F* E w then, as in Case (i), we conclude by 
(A. 1) that V = u”( F* ) , which again implies that F* is V belongs to New&,, (u, a”). 
Otherwise F’ E W’\W. Recall that D’ is obtained from D by replacing some occurrences 
of F with F’, so that 
w u {F’} = W’ U {F}, (A.4) 
and consequently F* = F’ and V = u’( F’). Moreover, equality (A.4) implies that 
F’ E W’ and F E W. From the last condition we see that F is u’(F) belongs to the 
left-hand side of (A.1 ). Consequently, it belongs to the right-hand side also, so that 
u’(F) = u”(F) . Since both u’ and u” satisfy S, u’(F) = u’( F’) and u”(F) = u”( F’). 
Thus 
V = u’( F’) = u’(F) = u”(F) = u”( F’). 
Since F’ E W’, it follows that the formula F* is V is in New&,, (u, u”) 
The proof in the other direction, from (A.2) to (A.l), is similar. 0 
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A.3. Proof of Theorem 3 (Section 4.1) 
Theorem 3. Let S be a set of constraints, D an action description, and B, B' formulas 
equivalent with respect to S. If an action description D’ is obtainedfrom D by replacing 
some occurrences of B with B’ then 
Ressuo = RessuDf .
Consider formulas B, B’ equivalent with respect to S. If C’ is the formula obtained 
from a formula C by replacing some occurrences of B with B’ then, for every valuation 
(T satisfying S, (T(C) = (T(C’). It follows that S U D and S U D’ have the same states, 
and, furthermore, 
Res& = ResgUD,, 
New&,, = New&D,1 
ReSsuD =f?esSup. 0 
A.4. Proof of Theorem 4 (Section 4.2) 
Theorem 4. Let S be a set of constraints, and let S’ be the set of determinate effect 
propositions A causes C for all constraints always C in S and all action names A. For 
any action description D, any action name A and any state u of S U D, 
Ressuo(A, (+) = ReSswo(A,g) 
Let S and S’ be as in the statement of the theorem, and let cr be a state of S U D. 
A valuation V’ belongs to RestluD (A, C) iff it belongs to Resi( A, c-r) and satisfies all 
constraints in S, that is to say, iff it belongs to Resic,D (A, cr) . Consequently, 
ResOsuD (A, CT) = Res$,D (A, a). 
Since S U D and S’ U D have the same indeterminate effect propositions, 
New&,, ((T, IT’) = New&, (g, c~‘) . 
These two formulas imply the assertion of the theorem. q 
A.5. Proof qf Theorem 5 {Section 4.3) 
Theorem 5. Let D be an action description containing an explicit definition of a 
propositional jluent name F, and let D’ be obtained from D by deleting this definition 
and by deleting F from the set of JEuent names. For any state CT of D, let fl,C be the 
restriction of cr to the set ofJuent names that are different from F. The function u H VF 
is an isomorphism between D and D’. 
It is clear that g H flF is a one-to-one function from the set of states of D onto 
the set of states of D’. We need to show that this function maps ResD( A, a) onto 
Resof(A,aF). 
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Observe first that it maps Rest (A, a) onto Rest, (A, (TF) . Indeed, if g’ E Rest (A, a) 
then uk E Res$ (A, uF). On the other hand, if a valuation U* belongs to Resi, (A, uF) 
then 8 = a; for the valuation LT’ defined by 
a’( F’) = 
u(C) if F’ = F, 
u* (F’) otherwise, 
where C is the right-hand side of the equivalence (6) defining F. Clearly P’ E 
Res$(A,u). 
Now it remains to note that, for any states g, u’ of D, since F is noninertial and 
does not occur in indeterminate effect propositions, 
NE?w$(a,(T’) =New&((TF,(Tk). 0 
A.6 Proof of Theorem 6 (Section 4.4) 
Theorem 6. Let D be an action description, and let F be a set of fluent names in 
the language of D such that every fluent name in F has a jinite range. The function 
u H UF is an isomorphism between D and DF. 
It is clear that u t--+ uf is a one-to-one function from the set of states of D into 
the set of valuations of DF. Furthermore, for every formula C in the language of D, 
u(C) = UF(CF); consequently, the range of this function is the set of states of DF. To 
complete the proof, we need to show that, for every action name A and every state u 
of D, this function maps Reso (A, u) onto ResDF (A, up). It is clear that the image of 
Resi (A, u) is Rest, (A, UF). Thus, we only need to verify that for any states u’, u” 
of D, the inclusion 
New$(u,u’) C Newi(u,u”) (-4.5) 
is equivalent to 
New&.(uF,Uk) & New&(gF,ug). (A.6) 
Assume (AS), and take any formula in New$,(crF, ub). If this formula is F is V 
for some F $ F then it belongs to the left-hand side of (A.5), and consequently to 
the right-hand side too, which implies that it belongs to the right-hand side of (A.6). 
Otherwise, this formula has the form F” is uk( F”) for some F E F. 
Case 1: F” is inertial and a;( F”) f UF( F”). Then F is inertial and u’(F) # 
u(F), so that F is a’( 8’) belongs to the left-hand side of (AS). Consequently, it 
belongs to the right-hand side also, which implies that u”(F) = u’(F). Then a:( F’) = 
ub (F”), so that F” is a:, (F”) belongs to the right-hand side of (A.6). 
Case 2: for some indeterminate effect proposition (3) in D, uF satisfies PF. Then 
u satisfies P, and we can again use (AS) to conclude that u”(F) = u’(F) and that 
F” is a>( F”) belongs to the right-hand side of (A.6). 
Now assume (A.6), and take any formula F is u’(F) in New$(u,u’). If F $! F 
then it belongs to the left-hand side of (A.6), and consequently to the right-hand side 
too, which implies that it belongs to the right-hand side of (A.5). Assume that F E F. 
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Case 1: F is inertial and g’(F) # a(F). Then Fg’cF) is inertial, a;( FC’(F)) = T 
and ffF ( FdCF) ) = F. It follows that FdcF) is T belongs to the left-hand side of (A.6). 
Consequently, it belongs to the right-hand side also, which implies that 
Hence g”(F) = (T’(F), so that F is d(F) belongs to the right-hand side of (A.5). 
Case 2: for some indeterminate effect proposition (3) in D, CT satisfies P. Then flF 
satisfies PJZ, and we can again use (A.6) to conclude that P:( FdCF)) = a;( FdcF)) = T 
and c”(F) = a’(F), and that F is d(F) belongs to the right-hand side of (A.5). 0 
A.7. Proof of Theorem 7 (Section 4.5) 
Theorem 7. For any action description D, any set S of indeterminate effect propositions, 
anq’ action name A and any state u of D, ResDu.~( A, CT) is the union of the sets 
ResnusC (A, (T) over all choice functions c for S. 
For any valuation U, define S’ to be S’ where c is the choice function obtained by 
restricting c to the domain of c. We will derive the theorem from the following lemma. 
Lemma. For any state d of D, (T’ E ResD”s( A, a) ifi u’ E Res,,s,f (A, v). 
The fact that Reso”s(A,a) is contained in the union of all sets of the form 
ResousC (A, a) immediately follows from the lemma. To prove the opposite inclusion, 
consider any choice function c such that U’ E Resousc (A, (T) ; we will show that 
Resn”s<(A,cT) = Res,,,+(A,g). (A.7) 
Consider a proposition 
A causes (F is c(F)) if P (A.8) 
in S” such that u satisfies P, and the corresponding proposition 
A causes (F is g’(F)) if P (A.9) 
in S”‘. Since U’ E Re$,,,(A,cr), g’(F) = c(F), so that (A.9) equals (A.8). Conse- 
quently, 
ResiuF ( A, a) = Re&,,, (A, a). 
Since D U S” and D U S” have the same indeterminate effect propositions, (A.7) 
immediately follows. 0 
Proof of the lemma. The proof is based on the following observations. Let r be the set 
of formulas F is d(F) such that (i) S contains at least one proposition (3) for which c 
satisfies P, (ii) D does not contain a proposition (3) for which u satisfies P, and (iii) 
g(F) = g’(F) (Intuitively, r is the set of all formulas that belong to NewgUs( V, u’) 
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only because of some proposition in S.) For every V* in ResODUS”, (A CT), if F is a’(F) 
belongs to r then g’(F) = CT*(F). It follows that, for all U* E Rest,,,, (A, a), 
New&s(a, IJ*) = New&,,, (g, (T*) U 1: (A.10) 
Moreover, the two sets in the right-hand side are disjoint: 
New&,f ( cr,fl*) nr =0. (A.1 I) 
Assume that a’ E Resms( A, CT). Then IZT’ belongs to Re.&,,, (A, (T) , because, for 
every determinate effect proposition (2) which is in DUS”’ but not in DUS, the formula 
C has the form F is a’(F). We need to show that there is no c” E ResLUS”, (A, CT) 
such that 
New&~ ((T, a”) c New&,, (c, v’) . 
Assume that such a V” exists. Then, by (A. 11) , 
New&,scrf ((~,d’) UTC New&,,,(o,~‘) UT. 
By (A.lO) we conclude that 
NewAUs(g,cr”) C NewiUs(a,a’), 
which contradicts the assumption that g’ E ResD”s(A, a). 
Now assume that U’ E ResDus,,r (A, a). Then U’ E Resi,s( A, a), because every 
determinate effect proposition in D U S belongs to D U d. We need to show that there 
is no uff E Restus (A, a) such that 
New& (o, (T”) C New&s (a, c’) . (A.12) 
Assume that such a U” exists. We want to use (A.lO) to simplify both parts of this 
inclusion. To this end, we need to prove that 8 E Rest,,,, (A, a). Consider any deter- 
minate effect proposition (2) which is in D U S”’ but not in D U S, such that (T satisfies 
P. This proposition has the form (A.9) for some indeterminate effect proposition (3) 
in S. Furthermore, F is d’(F) belongs to the left-hand side of (A.12), and conse- 
quently to the right-hand side also. It follows that c”(F) = a’(F), so that g” satisfies 
F is a’(F). We showed that g” indeed belongs to ResiuS.,, (A, a). Now from (A. 12) 
and (A. 10) we can conclude that 
New&,,,, (g,g”) U r C New&,,(u,fl’) U IY 
Then, by (A.1 l), 
New&,, (~,cr”) c fVew&sC,J ((T, cr'>, 
which contradicts the assumption that cr’ E ResDus,,l (A, (T) . 0 
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A.8. Proof of Theorem 8 (Section 6.3) 
Theorem 8. For any$nite action description D, any set I of initial conditions and any 
value proposition Q, Q is a consequence of the nested abnormality theory NAT( D, 1) 
iff Q is a consequence of the domain description D U I. 
This theorem is technically more difficult than the others, and what is presented in 
this section is only an outline of the proof. A complete proof of a similar result can be 
found in [ 13, Chapter 81. 
Recall that the result of circumscribing a predicate constant P, with object, function 
and/or predicate constants Z varied, in a sentence A is denoted by CIRC[A; P; Z]. 
The semantics of nested abnormality theories [ 181 is characterized by a map q that 
translates blocks into sentences of the underlying language of classical logic. The map 
is defined recursively: 
p{Ct,. . ,C,,, : AI,. . . ,A,} = 3abF(ab), 
where 
F(Ab) =CIRC[~A~A...A~A,;A~;C,,...,C,,]. 
The first in the series of lemmas needed to prove Theorem 8 relates the inner block 
of Axiom Group 5 
{Ff,. . . , F;” , max Poss : 
lPoss( a, I>, 
6 (QcDd), 
CRta,s) tc E D,) 
(A.13) 
to the function Res. The statement of the lemma uses the following notation. For any 
valuation (+, 5 stands for the conjunction of all domain formulas of the form F is c(F) . 
By L? we denote the set of pairs (A,a) such that Res(A, cr) = 8. Note that, in this 
definition, the set Res( A, a) can be equivalently replaced by its superset Res’( A, a), 
because, for a finite action description, the former cannot be empty unless the latter is 
empty also. 
Lemma 9. Assume that the set of states of D is nonempty. Axiom Groups l-3 entail 
that the result of applying p to block (A.13) is equivalent to the conjunction (of the 
universal closures) of the formulas 
lPoss( a, I), 
Q <Q~Dci)t 
CR(&s) (c E D,) 
(A.14) 
(A.15) 
(A.16) 
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Poss( a, s) ZE 1 s = _L v v (a=Ar\T(s))j. (A.17) 
(Ao)ET 
The proof of the lemma consists of two steps. First, introduce a new predicate constant 
Imposs, and let A (Imposs, FF, . . . , Fp) be the conjunction of formulas (A. 14)-(A.16) 
with dmposs substituted for Pass. Propositions 1 and 2 from [ 181 allow us to reduce the 
result of applying 9 to block (A.13) to the circumscription of imposs, with Fp, . . . , FfR 
varied, in A( Imposs, Ff, . . . , Fp). Second, this circumscription can be computed using 
the following general fact [ 17, Proposition 3.4.11: 
Theorem. Let E be a predicate expression without parameters, containing neither P 
nor Z. If the sentences 
A(P, 2) 3 3zA(E, z) 
A(P,Z) > E < P 
are universally valid, then so is the sentence 
CIRC[A(P,Z);P;Z] =A(P,Z) r\P=E. (A.18) 
In our case, P is Imposs, Z is Ff, . , Fr, and we take E to be 
/\as[s=iV V (a=Ar\a(s))]. 
(A,rr)E\‘ 
To verify the condition 
A(fmposs,Ff,.,.,F/? >3fl,...,fiA(E,fl,...,fi), 
consider the following formulas c/i (a, s, u) : 
I/;(a,s,o)= V (a=AAT(s)Ao=g(F)) 
V v (LZ=AA\(S)/\U=YA,,(F)), 
(A,v)@Z’ 
where r,Q, is a fixed element of Res”( A, (T). The function fi is selected to satisfy the 
condition 
Vas U;li(a,s, fi(a,s)). 
Using Lemma 9, we can prove the following two lemmas that together establish the 
validity of Theorem 8 in both directions. 0 
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Lemma 10. For every history UO, Al, CTI,. . , A,, g, that satisjes all initial conditions 
in I there exists a model M of NAT( D, I) that satisfies 
~,([AI,...,A,I)A[AI,...,A,I f 1 
Lemma 11. For any model M of NAT( D, I), any actions Al,. . , A,,, A,,+, and arq 
states CT and u’, if M satisfies 
~([AI,... ,&I) A;ST([A,,...>&,A,+,l) A [A~>...,&,&+ll # J- 
then g’ E Res(A,,+I,cr). 
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